The study did not conclude that the laparoscope could have been the vehicle of GAS transmission because the screening of the only shared parts of the laparoscope (the light source, camera and telescope) did not detect

any GAS contamination. No breach of surgical aseptic techniques or lack of compliance with standard precautions during surgeries was noted. Moreover, no GAS infection was identified in either of the two obstetrical procedures performed between the surgeries of the two patients or in any of the additional 12 gynecological laparoscopic surgeries performed in the same operating room. The case histories, clinical examination and surveillance cultures of the healthcare personnel involved in the care of the two patients in the report revealed that two staff members had Gefitinib mw throat colonization with strains epidemiologically

different from each other and from the outbreak strain. This finding this website is in contrast with reports from earlier studies, in which most GAS outbreaks could be traced to a single healthcare worker colonized with the same strain [7], [8], [12] and [13]. Unfortunately, in spite of the extensive investigations of all involved personnel and the environment, the mode of transmission of GAS to the second patient could not be established. This finding coincides with earlier reports that presented similar results [14], [15], [16] and [17]. However, in spite of the inconclusive evidence, we believe that the index patient could have served as the source of the infection in the second patient. GAS was recovered from the index patient upon admission. Aerosolization has been widely documented as a major route of transmission. The supporting evidentiary factors for this theory are: the lack of direct contact between a case and a carrier; GAS-positive

quantitative air cultures obtained in the presence of a carrier; and an occurrence of infections in patients undergoing surgery in rooms recently vacated by a GAS carrier [18], [19] and [20]. Although however airborne transmission has been reported by some authors as an inefficient route of transmission, more recent data has linked occurrences of outbreaks to throat colonization of health care workers [12], [21] and [22]. It appears that the abdominal incision could have served as the portal of entry for infection in the 2nd case; therefore, we hypothesize that droplet and/or, to a lesser extent, airborne transmission caused the spread of infection to the second patient. In almost 50% of reported cases, a definite portal of entry could not be described [23]. The organism can be acquired through person-to-person contact [17], but our involved personnel did not have skin infections with GAS or any other overt infection. Both patients were strictly isolated according to transmission-based precautionary procedures. Unfortunately, we did not screen the throats, rectums and vaginas of both patients for GAS colonization.